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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the semantic properties of the subjunctive mood in Spanish. My 
main goal here is to argue for a new semantics of the verbs that select subjunctive 
mood in their complement clause, based on an alternative semantics. I propose the 
hypothesis that Spanish subjunctive clauses require contexts that make ordered 
alternatives available. 
Whether the verb of an embedded clause is in the indicative or the 
subjunctive mood is determined by the matrix verb. The indicative mood is selected 
by epistemic verbs (e.g . ,  know, think, believe), declarative verbs (e.g . ,  say, write, 
declare), predicates of certainty (e.g . ,  be sure, be convinced) , comissives (e .g . ,  
promise) , and fiction verbs (e.g. , dream, imagine ) . 1  A few examples are presented in 
( 1 )  through (4) . 
( 1 )  Victoria cree que hara buen tiempo. TO BELIEVE 
Victoria believes that make [Fut. Ind.] good weather. 
'Victoria believes that the weather will be nice . '  
(2) Sofia sabe que se  ha planeado un picnic . TO KNOW 
Sofia knows that SE has planned [Ind.] a picnic. 
'Sofia knows that a picnic has been planned . '  
(3) Marcela dice que no sabe si puede venir. TO SAY 
Marcela says that not knows[Ind.]  if can come. 
'Marcela says that she doesn ' t  know whether she can come. ' 
(4) Sofia ha prometido que traera el postre. TO PROMISE 
Sofia has promised that bring [Fut. Ind. ]  the desert. 
'Sofia has promised that she will bring the desert. ' 
The subjunctive mood is selected by desire predicates (e.g . ,  want, wish, 
hope) , directives (e.g . ,  order, advise, suggest) , modals (e.g . ,  it is possible, it is likely), 
predicates expressing doubt (e.g . ,  not believe, doubt) and emotivefactive predicates 
(e.g . ,  regret, be glad, be surprised) . A few examples are presented in (5) through (8) .  
(5) Victoria quiere que Marcela venga al picnic. 
Victoria wants that Marcela come [Subj .] to-the picnic. 
'Victoria wants Marcela to come to the picnic. '  
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Victoria sugiere que salgan temprano. 
Victoria suggests that leave[Subj . ] early. 
'Victoria suggests that they leave early. '  
SofIa duda que Marcela pueda venir. 
Sofia doubts that Marcela can[Subj . ] come. 
'Sofia doubts that Marcela can come. '  
TO SUGGEST 
TO DOUBT 
(8) Marcela se lamenta de que no Ie hayan avisado antes. TO REGRET 
Marcela SE regrets of that not her have told [Subj . ]earlier. 
'Marcela regrets that they didn ' t  tell her earlier. ' 
The subjunctive mood in Romance languages has received considerable 
attention in traditional as well as in recent theoretical linguistic literature. 
Subjunctive mood has been related to notions such as Irrealis (Giv6n 1 994) , Non­
assertion (Bolinger 1 968, Terrell & Hooper 1 974) , Strong Intensionality (Farkas 
1985,  1 992) , Non-Veridicality (Giannakidou 1 997) , Model Shift (Quer 1 998), 
Modality (Giorgi & Piannesi 1 997, Portner 1 992, 1997), and many more. For reasons 
of space, I will not present these approaches here nor will I contrast them with my 
proposal .2 I will limit myself to a discussion of one recent approach by Giorgi and 
Piannesi ( 1997) , who propose that the licensing contexts for subjunctive mood can 
be characterized with Kratzer' s  ( 1 977, 198 1 ,  1 999) semantics for modality. At first 
sight, their proposal resembles the approach that I will defend here. But after closer 
examination, we will see that these two approaches make rather different predictions. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the meaning properties 
of the verbs that select subjunctive mood in Spanish are investigated. In section 3, an 
alternative semantics for these verbs is developed and the role of subjunctive mood 
in the meaning composition is discussed. In section 4, the proposal is compared to 
a modal semantics for verbs that select subjunctive mood (cf. Giorgi and Piannesi 
1997) .  I present a number of challenges for the modal approach and argue that these 
can be accommodated straightforwardly in my proposal .  
2. A Semantics for desire verbs (Heim 1992) 
In this section, I present Heim' s ( 1 992) analysis of desire predicates which builds on 
Stalnaker' s ( 1 984) insight that every desire report contains a hidden conditional .  'A 
little more explicitly, the leading intuition is that John wants you to leave means that 
John thinks that if you leave he will be in a more desirable world than if you don' t. ' 
(Heim 1992, p. 1 93) .  I then argue that such a conditional semantics should be 
extended to all verbs that select the subjunctive mood in Spanish. 
We begin with the semantics for propositional attitude verbs first introduced 
by Hintikka ( 1 969) . The definition for the verb believe is given in (9) . 
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(9) ' a  believes <1>' is true in w iff: V w' E Doxcx(w) : <I> is true in w' . 
(DoxcxCw) contains all the worlds that are compatible with what a believes to 
be true in the world w.) 
Adopting the Hintikka-style analysis for a verb such as want results in the 
definition given in ( 1 0) .  Here, the worlds compatible with a ' s  beliefs in w (the 
doxastic alternatives) have simply been replaced with the worlds compatible with a ' s  
desires in  w (the buletic alternatives). 
( 1 0) ' a  wants <1>' is true in w iff: V w' E Bulcx(w) : <I> is true in w ' . 
(Bulcx(w) contains all the worlds that are compatible with what a wants in w.) 
That this definition, however, cannot appropriately capture all the characteristics of 
the verb want, becomes clear as soon as the relevant examples are examined more 
closely. The example in ( 1 1 ) , from Heim ( 1 992) , illustrates that this definition is 
problematic. 
( 1 1 )  I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester. 
Heim notes that ( 1 1 )  can be true in a situation in which I would prefer not to 
teach at all . In such a situation, then, in all the worlds that are compatible with what 
I desire, I do not teach. If we adopt the definition in ( 1 0) ,  however, the sentence is 
false in this situation. The definition of want thus needs to make explicit that the 
subject only takes into consideration those worlds that shelhe believes are possible . 
Heim ( 1 992) develops a new definition that captures Stalnaker' s  insight that 
every desire report employs a hidden conditional : ' to want something, is to prefer 
something to certain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those 
possibilities that the agent believes will be realizable if he doesn' t  get what he 
wants . '  (Stalnaker 1 984, p .89). The sentence ( 1 1 )  can thus be paraphrased as in ( 1 2) .  
( 1 2) If I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester, I will be in a more desirable 
world than if I don' t  teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester. 
Following Lewis ( 1 973) and Stalnaker ( 1 968), a conditional if t/J, 1/1 is true in a 
world w iff lIT is true in all <I>-worlds maximally similar to w.  By adopting such a 
conditional semantics, Heim defines the verb want as in ( 1 3) .  
( 1 3) 'a  wants <1>' is true in w iff: For every w' E Doxcx(w): 
Every <I>-world maximally similar to w'  is more desirable to a in w than any 
non-<I>-world maximally similar to w' . 
Under this definition, for ( 1 1 )  to be true, the following has to hold: each 
doxastic alternative in which I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays is more desirable than 
minimally different worlds in which I don't .  And each doxastic alternative in which 
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I don' t  teach Tuesday &Thursday is less desirable than minimally different worlds 
in which I do. 
In Heim ( 1 992), the formal definition of this verb is stated in a Context 
Change Semantics . Since, in this paper, I do not use this framework, I present the 
equivalent definition in a non-dynamic semantics . Heim encodes the relation of 
comparative similarity among worlds with a family of selection functions: for each 
world w, there is a selection function SiIIlw from propositions to propositions which 
maps each p to the set of p-worlds maximally similar to w.  
( 14) SiIIlw(P)= { w ' E  p and w' resembles w no less than any other world in p }  
Additionally, Heim uses an abbreviation for the ranking of possible worlds 
in terms of desirability. She introduces <a. w , a relation between worlds, that can also 
be employed in an extended sense as a relation between propositions, as defined in 
( 1 5) .  
( 1 5) (a) For any w, w' , w" E W, w'  <a.,w w" iff w'  is more desirable to a in w 
than w" 
(b) For any w E  p, p� W, q�W, P <a.,w q iff w' <a.,w w" for all w' E p, w"E q .  
The formal definition of the verb want can now be stated as  in ( 1 6) .  
( 1 6) Conditional semantics for want 
[ [want]] (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff V w' E Doxa(w):  SiIIlw'(P) <a,w SiIIlw'(""P) 
In other words, in ( 1 6) ,  a wants p is true in w iff for every world w'  
compatible with a 's  beliefs, the p-worlds closest to  w'  are more desirable to  a in w 
than the -,p-worlds closest to w' . 
Heim notes that, when extending such a definition to other desire predicates, 
one soon runs into problems. The sentence in ( 1 7) illustrates the verb wish. 
( 1 7) John wishes he would teach on Tuesdays . 
This sentence can only be judged to be true in a situation in which John 
believes that he doesn' t  teach on Tuesdays . Hence, the worlds compatible with his 
beliefs only include worlds in which he doesn ' t  teach on Tuesdays, and the definition 
in ( 1 6) cannot be adopted. Heim suggests that, for the verb wish, the proposition is 
evaluated with respect to the revised set of worlds compatible with his beliefs . We 
add to the set of his doxastic alternatives all the (maximally similar) worlds in which 
John teaches on Tuesdays . The meaning of ( 1 7) can then be paraphrased as 'John 
thinks that if he taught on Tuesdays he would be in a more desirable world then he 
is in (because he is not teaching on Tuesdays) . '  Heim's  definition of the verb wish 
is given in ( 1 8) .  
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( 1 8) Conditional semantics for wish 
[ [wish] ] (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff \f w' E revised Doxa(w) : SiIllw' (P) <a,w SiIllw' (") 
Heim ( 1 992) furthermore extends her proposal to factive desire predicates such as 
be glad, illustrated by the following example. 
( 1 9) John is glad that he will teach on Tuesdays . 
The sentence in ( 1 9) has the presupposition that John believes in the truth of 
the complement, i .e. that he will teach on Tuesdays . As before, since John ' s  doxastic 
alternatives do not include worlds in which he doesn' t  teach on Tuesdays, the 
definition of the verb be glad has to make reference to a revised set of his doxastic 
alternatives . The meaning of ( 1 9) can then be paraphrased as 'John thinks that 
(because he will teach on Tuesdays) he is in a more desirable world than he would 
be if he wouldn't  teach on Tuesdays . '  The verb be glad is defined in (20) . 
(20) Conditional semantics for be glad 
[ [be glad] ] (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff \f w' E revised Doxa(w) : Simw' (p) <a,w Simw' (") 
To summarize, desire verbs such as wish, want and be glad share their core 
semantics, with the only difference that wish and be glad make reference to the 
revision of DoxcxCw). 
After this brief presentation of Heim' s semantics for desire predicates , we 
now return to the class of verbs that select subjunctive mood in Spanish. The desire 
predicates that we have just discussed all select the subjunctive mood in Spanish. 
Interestingly, whether counterfactual worlds are evaluated or not, does not play a role 
for the selection of subjunctive mood. The conditional semantics adopted so far can 
straightforwardly be extended to all other verb classes that select the SUbjunctive 
mood in Spanish, such as directives, predicates of doubt, modals and emotive factive 
predicates .  A common property of these verbs thus seems to emerge: they require a 
conditional semantics . Note that the comparison relation is not a relation of 
desirability for all predicates . Verbs such as be surprised, doubt rather require a 
comparison relation of likelihood. Consequently, I assume that the comparison 
relation (or scale) is contributed by the lexical meaning of each verb. A first attempt 
for a generalization for the subjunctive mood in Spanish is stated in (2 1 ) . 
(2 1 )  Preliminary generalization for SUbjunctive mood in Spanish 
An embedded proposition p requires the subjunctive mood, if p is compared 
to non-p on a scale introduced by the matrix verb. 
I now tum to a discussion of examples that call for a revision of the semantics 
discussed in this section. 
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3. An Alternative Semantics for the Subjunctive Mood in Spanish 
In this section, I argue that the proposed semantics for the verbs selecting subjunctive 
mood in Spanish has to be revised and that it crucially involves comparison of the 
embedded proposition p with contextually available alternatives, rather than with ""p. 
After presenting evidence from contexts that contain more than two alternatives, I 
develop a new analysis for these verbs. I then restate the generalization for the verbs 
selecting the subjunctive mood in Spanish, and discuss the possible contribution of 
the subjunctive mood to the meaning composition. 
3. 1 .  More than two alternatives 
The central point to be made here, is that the semantics of verbs selecting subjunctive 
mood require comparison of contextual alternative propositions .  In fact, the 
definition adopted so far refers to a special case, namely, when the context only 
provides the alternatives p and 'P. Contexts providing more than two alternatives 
illustrate this issue quite clearly. Consider the scenario in (22) . 
(22) Sofia has promised to bring a desert to the picnic . Victoria knows that there 
are three possibilities. She could prepare a chocolate cake, even though that 
is completely unlikely because that represents far too much work. She might 
bring an apple pie, which is very likely since she can just buy it at the bakery 
nearby. Or she might bring ice-cream, which is most likely, since she usually 
has some in her freezer. Victoria prefers the chocolate cake over the apple pie 
and the apple pie over the ice-cream. 
The schematic figure in (23) represents the two scales involved in this scenario. That 
Soffa will bring the chocolate cake is the most desirable and less likely alternative; 
that she will bring the ice cream is the less desirable and most likely alternative. 
(23) + desirable 
- desirable I 
chocolate cake 
apple pie 
ice cream I
- likely 
+ likely 
In this situation, the sentence in (24) is intuitively judged to be false. 
(24) Victoria wants Soffa to bring the apple pie. 
However, if we apply Heim' s definition of the verb want, this sentence 
comes out as true in the scenario (22) : the worlds in which Soffa brings the apple pie 
are more desirable to Victoria than all the minimally different worlds in which she 
doesn't .  This is true, since this set does not contain worlds in which she brings 
chocolate cake (these are not minimally different, because they are completely 
unlikely) . The worlds in which she doesn' t  bring the apple pie are less desirable to 
Victoria than minimally different worlds in which she does. These contain worlds in 
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which she brings ice cream. A conditional semantics thus does not make the correct 
predictions for this scenario. 
Other verbs give rise to similar effects in contexts that make more than two 
alternatives available. Imagine that, in the continuation of the scenario in (22), Sofia 
does in fact bring the apple pie to the picnic and that Victoria is totally disappointed. 
The sentence in (25) can then be considered to be true in that situation. 
(25) Victoria regrets that Sofia brought the apple pie. 
A conditional semantics for the verb regret, however, predicts (25) to be false 
in this scenario. It predicts that the worlds in which Sofia brought the apple pie are 
less desirable to Victoria than all the minimally different worlds in which she 
doesn' t. This is false, since the latter set contains some worlds in which she instead 
brings ice-cream (which are worlds that are worse for Victoria, since she disprefers 
ice-cream) . Again, a conditional semantics does not make the correct predictions for 
a scenario as in (22) . 
I conclude that the semantics of the verbs under discussion involves 
comparison of p with its contextual alternatives rather than with --,>. In the following 
section, I propose to revise the semantics accordingly. 
3.2. An alternative semantics for the verb 'want ' 
Given the above, we revise the definition of want so as to incorporate comparison of 
p with its contextual alternatives . The new definition is given in (26) . 
(26) ' a wants <1>' is true in w iff 
V w' E DoxcxCw) : V 1j1 that is a contextual alternative to <1>: 
{ w ' :  <I> is true in w'  } <a.w { w' :lj1 is true in w' } 
In what follows, I argue that, in this definition, reference to the doxastic 
alternatives is in fact not necessary. The definition can then be simplified accordingly 
as in (27).  
(27) ' a wants <1>' is true in w iff 
V 1j1 that is a contextual alternative to <1>: <I> <a.w 1j1 
There are several reasons that make the reference to doxastic alternatives 
unnecessary. Heim' s initial motivation for introducing the doxastic alternatives in the 
definition of want is absent under this new perspective. Recall that it was necessary 
to make reference to the worlds that are compatible with the subject' s  beliefs, since 
a sentence such as 'I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays ' can be true in a scenario 
in which I would in fact prefer to not teach at all .  When adopting the definition in 
(27), however, the sentence can be true in such a situation, even though (27) does not 
make reference to the doxastic alternatives .  In this situation 'I do not teach at all '  is 
simply not an available alternative. 
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Another reason for eliminating the doxastic alternatives from the definition 
are practical inferences.  The practical inference illustrated in (28) is illicit and 
indicates that someone' s  desires are not necessarily affected by his/her beliefs . To 
desire something does not require that one desire all its consequences . 
(28) I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester. 
I believe that I can only teach Tu&Thu next semester if I work hard now . 
., :. I want to work hard now. 
A final argument for eliminating the doxastic alternatives from the definition 
comes from the fact that desires and beliefs can sometimes even be contradictory, as 
illustrated in the example from Heim ( 1 992) in (29) . I can desire this weekend to last 
forever even if I believe that this is in fact impossible. 
(29) I want this weekend to last forever. 
To conclude, I propose to eliminate reference to the doxastic alternatives in the 
definition of want, and to implement its lexical entry as in (30). 
(30) Alternative Semantics for want 
[ [wantcl ]g(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff \;/ q E g(C) : p <DES a.w q 
where <DES a,w is defined as follows 
(a) For any w, W ' , w" E W, W ' <DES «,W w" iff w' is more desirable to ex in 
w than w" . 
(b) For any w E  p, p� W, q�W, P <DES «,W q iff w'  <DES «,W w" for all w' E p, 
w" E q. 
In this definition, the verb want carries an index C that stands for a variable 
anaphoric to a contextually determined set of propositions (it is an index of type 
« s,t>,t» ) .  This variable receives its content from the variable assignment g. I may 
mention here that variables of this kind have also been used before for similar 
purposes, such as for the domain of quantification of only in Rooth ( 1 985,  1 992) and 
the resource domain of adverbs of quantification in von Fintel ( 1 994). 
3.3. Two semantic verb classes 
The alternative semantics presented in the previous section can be extended to all 
verbs that select subjunctive mood in Spanish. The scale of comparison may differ 
from verb to verb and should thus be contributed by the lexical meaning of the verb. 
The following generalization for subjunctive mood in Spanish can now be proposed. 
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(3 1 )  New Generalization for Subjunctive Mood in Spanish 
An embedded proposition p requires the subjunctive mood, if p is compared 
to its contextually available alternatives on a scale introduced by the verb. 
It is still necessary to show that this characterization based on an alternative 
semantics correctly excludes all verbs that select the indicative mood in Spanish. For 
most verbs of this class, such as declarative verbs, predicates of certainty, comissives 
and fiction verbs, it seems obvious that such an alternative semantics cannot 
appropriately express their meaning. For example, to say that p cannot mean to say 
p more than its alternatives, simply because what is said cannot be graded. However, 
nothing seems to prevent us from attributing an alternative semantics to a verb such 
as believe, even though it selects the indicative mood in Spanish. To believe that p 
could mean to consider p more believablellikely than its alternatives. Interestingly, 
the verb believe displays crosslinguistic variation for its mood selection properties . 
In Italian, for example, believe selects the subjunctive mood contrary to Spanish. I 
propose then that believe can in principle receive slightly different interpretations . In 
a language in which believe selects the subjunctive mood, it does not have the exact 
same meaning as in a language in which it selects the indicative mood. In Spanish, 
the lexical entry for believe is the Hintikka-style definition presented before in (9) . 
There is some first linguistic evidence that an alternative semantics 
appropriately characterizes the verbs that select subjunctive mood in Spanish. Such 
verbs more readily allow for degree modification. The verbs selecting indicative 
mood, on the contrary, generally disallow such degree modification.4 (32) illustrates 
the case of verbs selecting the indicative mood, while (33) illustrates verbs that select 
the subjunctive mood. Degree modification with 'mucho ' ( 'a lot ') is only possible 
in (33) .  
(32) *Victoria sabe /cree /declara mucho que Sofia traera el postre . 
Victoria knowslbelieves/declares a-lot that Sofia bring [Fut. Ind. ]  the desert. 
'Victoria very much knowslbelieves/declares that Sofia will bring the desert. ' 
(33) Marcela quiere/recomiendalduda mucho que Sofia venga. 
Marcela wants/recommends/doubts a-lot that Sofia come [Subj ] .  
'Marcela very much wants/recommends/doubts that Sofia will come. ' 
To conclude, I have proposed to adopt an alternative semantics for the verbs 
that select the subjunctive mood. The fact that these verbs more readily allow for 
degree modification provides linguistic evidence for the claim that these verbs 
compare alternatives on a scale. Further evidence will be discussed in section 4. 
3.4. What is the role o/ the subjunctive mood? 
We now tum to the role of the subjunctive mood in the meaning composition. In (34) 
I repeat once more the lexical entry for the verb want, and present a (simplified) tree 
structure for a Spanish sentence in (35) .  
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(34) [ [wantc1 ]g(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff V q E g(C) : p <DES a,w q 
(35) S 
� 
NP VP 
� 
Vc MoodP 
[+subj ]  IP 
� 
P 
I will assume that the subjunctive mood is realized as a feature in a projection above 
IP, presumably MoodP. The question is what role this feature plays in the meaning 
composition. One possibility would be to attribute to the feature [+subjunctive] a 
similar role to that of a focus feature: it introduces a variable that constrains the 
domain of quantification of C to a subset of the set of alternatives to p (cf. Rooth 
1 992) . 
Negative Polarity Items have recently received a very similar treatment in 
Krifka ( 1 990, 1 992, 1 994, 1 995). Krifka proposes that Negative Polarity Items 
introduce alternatives into the semantics . These alternatives induce an ordering 
relation of semantic specificity, where the NPI itself denotes a most specific element 
in that order. 
There is an interesting parallelism between such a semantics for NPls and the 
one that I am investigating here for subjunctive clauses : both involve ranking of 
alternatives on a scale. While in the case of NPIs the scale is inherent to the meaning 
of the NPI, for subjunctive clauses the scale is introduced by the verb. A parallel 
semantics for subjunctive clauses and NPls would of course be a welcome result, 
given their strikingly similar distribution observed in the literature (cf. Giannakidou 
1 997, Nathan & Epro 1 984) . 
4. Alternative Semantics versus Modal Semantics 
In this section, I compare my proposal to the approach taken in Giorgi and Piannesi 
( 1 997) . These authors defend the idea that, in Romance languages, subjunctive mood 
is selected in contexts that can be characterized with Kratzer' s semantics of modality. 
In particular, they propose that subjunctive mood appears in contexts that require a 
non null ordering source. At first sight, their proposal will appear to be similar to the 
approach developed here. They characterize the licensing contexts for subjunctive 
clause as sets of ordered worlds . I argue here that SUbjunctive clauses require 
contexts that make ordered alternatives available, i .e .  a set of ordered propositions. 
The main goal of this section is to show that these two theories are not equivalent and 
that there are several empirical differences between these two approaches.  I will point 
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to several problematic consequences for Giorgi and Piannesi ' s approach and show 
that the proposal developed here has several empirical advantages. 
Before comparing these two theories, I briefly introduce Kratzer' s  theory of 
modality and make explicit how the meaning of the verbs that select the subjunctive 
mood can be defined in such a framework. 
4. 1 .  A Modal Semanticsfor the Subjunctive Mood 
Kratzer ( 1 977, 1 98 1 ,  1 99 1 )  develops a semantics where modal expressions are 
dependent on two contextual parameters , a modal base and an ordering source. The 
modal base is a set of worlds determined by a conversational background f.5 The 
ordering source is a second conversational background g that can induce an ordering 
on the modal base. 
A set of propositions A can induce an ordering � A on the set of all possible 
worlds in the following way (following Lewis 1 98 1 ) . 
(36) The ordering � A: 
"if w , z E W: w � A z iff {p : pE A and zE p }  � { p: pE A and wE p }  
' A  world w is at least as close to the ideal A as a world z iff all propositions 
of A which are true in z, are true in w as well . '  
Sentences containing modals are then evaluated with respect to an ordered set of 
worlds . The two contextual parameters are usually not expressed explicitly in the 
sentence but have to be recovered from the context. Consider the following example 
in (37) in the context of the previous scenario (22) . 
(37) Sofia should bring the chocolate cake. 
When this sentence is interpreted in the scenario (22) , the modal base is formed by 
the worlds that are compatible with what Victoria believes .  The ordering source is 
a set of propositions determined by Victoria' s desires . This set of propositions can 
induce an ordering on the set of worlds compatible with her beliefs . The meaning of 
(37) can then be paraphrased as in (38) .  
(38) In view of what Victoria believes and in view of what she desires, it  is 
necessary that Sofia bring the chocolate cake. 
We now turn to the implementation of such a modal semantics for verbs selecting the 
subjunctive mood. Giorgi and Piannesi ( 1 997) propose that subjunctive clauses are 
evaluated in contexts that are formed with a non null ordering source. They do not 
provide an explicit definition of the verbs that select SUbjunctive mood, though. 
Following Kratzer' s  assumptions, the semantics of the verb want can be defined as 
in (39), adopted from von Fintel ( 1 999).6 
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(39) [ [wantsj] ]f,g (p)(a)(w) = True iff 'v' w' E maxgi(a,w)(fj(a,w» : w' E p. 
where 'v' x � W: maxp{ X }  = {w E X: ...,:3 w' E  X :  w' <p w }  
and fj(a,w) corresponds and the modal base according to a in w and gj(a,w) 
to the ordering source according to a in w. 
Parallel to the verb should in the example (37), the verb want requires the modal base 
fj( a, w) to be formed by the worlds that are compatible with a ' s beliefs . The ordering 
source gj(a,w) is formed by the set of a ' s desires. In other words, « wants ¢J is true 
in w iff among the worlds compatible with a ' s beliefs the ones that maximally 
correspond to a ' s  desires in w are all p-worlds . 
Such a modal semantics can be extended to all verbs that select the 
subjunctive mood in Spanish. Two types of parameters of variation are expected. 
First, the modal base will differ for certain verbs:  verbs such as wish and be glad 
require a modal base formed by the revised set of doxastic alternatives ,  so as to 
include counterfactual worlds .  Second, the ordering source varies from verb to verb. 
For verbs such as want and wish the ordering is determined by the desires of the 
subject, while for verbs such as be surprised and doubt the ordering is determined 
by what the subject considers likely. 
In the following, I investigate a few challenges for a modal semantics of the 
verbs that select the subjunctive mood. 
4.2. Challenges/or a Modal Semantics o/ the Subjunctive Mood 
In this section, I argue that there are some empirical differences between a modal 
semantics for the verbs selecting the subjunctive mood (henceforth the Modal 
Theory) and the proposal made here (henceforth the Ordered Alternatives Theory) . 
We will see that some problematic consequences of the Modal Theory can be 
straightforwardly accommodated within the Ordered Alternatives Theory. 
The Modal Theory attributes the same semantics to verbs selecting the 
subjunctive mood as to modal verbs. Practical Inferences show that this assumption 
is problematic .  A practical inference may have the form in (40) , (cf. , e .g . ,  von Wright 
1 973) .  From the two premisses in a) and b) we can infer c). Importantly, however, 
we cannot infer d) . 
(40) a) Marcela wants to go to the picnic. 
b) Marcela knows that she can only go to the picnic if she works extra hours . 
c) :. Marcela should work extra hours . 
d) "" :. Marcela wants to work extra hours . 
The Modal Theory predicts that c) and d) should be equivalent, since these sentences 
receive an equivalent semantics . Adopting the definition of want as given in (39), we 
predict the following. From a) follows that among the worlds compatible with 
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Marcela' s beliefs ,  the ones that maximally correspond to her desires in w are all 
worlds in which she goes to the picnic . From b) follows that Marcela knows that all 
worlds in which she goes to the picnic are worlds in which she works extra hours . 
We can infer that among the worlds compatible with Marcela' s beliefs the ones that 
maximally correspond to her desires in w are all worlds in which she works extra 
hours , and we expect d) to be true. The Modal Theory thus predicts that d) should be 
a possible inference from a) and b), which is not the case. 
The Ordered Alternatives Theory, on the contrary, does not predict the 
equivalence of c) and d) , since, under this theory, these sentences receive different 
semantic representations . Furthermore, for a) and d) the set of relevant alternatives 
is not the same. For example, for a) it could be { Marcela goes to the picnic, Marcela 
goes to work, Marcela stays at home } ,  while for d) it could be { Marcela works extra 
hours, Marcela doesn' t  work extra hours. } .  No inference is thus expected. 
Another challenge to the Modal Theory is presented by the verb be glad. This 
verb illustrates that not all verbs require the embedded proposition to be the best 
alternative, but only a good alternative. This becomes evident in a scenario that 
makes more than two alternatives available, as the one described previously in (22) , 
represented here again by the picture in (4 1 ) . 
(4 1 )  + desirable 
- desirable I 
chocolate cake 
apple pie 
ice cream I
- likely 
+ likely 
In this scenario, the sentence in (42) can be judged to be true, even though 'Sofia 
brought the apple pie' is not the best alternative. 
(42) Victoria is glad that Softa brought the apple pie. 
The Modal Theory, however, predicts that (42) should be false in this 
scenario. It predicts that among the worlds compatible with Victoria' s revised beliefs, 
the ones that maximally correspond to Victoria' s preferences in w are all worlds in 
which Softa brings the apple pie. 
Can the Ordered Alternatives Theory accommodate the fact that the 
proposition p does not always have to be the best alternative? The verbs under 
discussion seem to vary with respect to this issue. Some verbs, such as prefer, for 
example, require p to be ranked highest among the alternatives, whereas other verbs 
such as be glad, regret only require p to be a good alternative. This information 
should then be encoded in the lexical entry of these verbs, and is independent of the 
assumption that alternatives are being compared. The lexical entry for be glad can 
be formalized as in (43) .  
(43) [ [be gladc1]g(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff :3 q E g(C) : p <DES a,w q 
Another interesting challenge for the Modal Theory is presented by 
entailment relations. When entailment relations hold between two propositions, these 
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do not hold anymore once the propositions are embedded under verbs such as be 
glad, regret, be surprised. While in (44) , a) entails b), in (45) ,  a) does not entail b) .7 
(44) a) He bought a Honda. 
b) He bought a car. 
(45) a) I am glad he bought a Honda. 
b) I am glad he bought a car. 
The sentence (45a) can very well be true in a situation in which I am not glad 
at all that he bought a car. But given that he has bought one, I am glad that he bought 
a Honda rather than another car. 
The Modal Theory, however, predicts that (45b) should be true whenever 
(45a) is true. If we use a modal definition for the verb be glad, the following holds . 
Among the worlds compatible with my revised beliefs , the ones that maximally 
correspond to my preferences in w are all worlds in which he bought a Honda. All 
worlds in which he bought a Honda are worlds in which he bought a car. Hence, we 
can conclude that among the worlds compatible with my revised beliefs,  the ones that 
maximally correspond to my preferences in w are all worlds in which he bought a 
car. 
Kadmon and Landman ( 1 993) suggest that for verbs such as be glad there is 
another contextually interpreted modal parameter involved, a so-called perspective. 
The perspective enters into the semantics of these verbs and affects the truth 
conditions of sentences containing it. This would explain why it is possible for me 
to be glad that he bought a Honda (because a Honda is a better choice than other 
cars), and at the same time not be glad that he bought a Honda (because I have 
something against buying cars), without contradicting myself. Kadmon and Landman 
( 1 993) claim that entailment relations are maintained unless the perspective changes. 
However, they do not present an explicit proposal as to how this perspective is to be 
incorporated into a modal semantics of verbs such as be glad. The Ordered 
Alternatives Theory provides us with the means to make this notion more explicit, 
as will become clear below. 
The Ordered Alternatives Theory, contrary to the Modal Theory, does not 
predict that an entailment relation should hold between (45a) and (45b) . This is so 
since the set of contextual alternatives differs in both cases . In a) , the set of 
alternatives could be { He bought a Honda, He bought a Toyota, He bought a 
Mercedes } ,  while in b), it could be {He bought a car, He bought a bike, He didn't  
buy anything } .  Kadmon and Landman' s  notion of perspective can then be 
characterized with the help of the set of alternatives . A change in perspective is 
determined by a change of the set of alternatives . 
A final argument in favor of the Ordered Alternative Theory comes from 
examples that involve Focus. As already pointed out in Dretske ( 1 972), focused 
phrases embedded under certain propositional attitude verbs give rise to meaning 
differences . The two sentences in (46) and (47) have different truth conditions (in the 
example, words in capital letters are focused) . 
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(46) Victoria wants SOFIA to bring the chocolate cake. 
(47) Victoria wants Sofia to bring the CHOCOLATE CAKE. 
How can the Modal Theory account for these meaning differences? No 
framework has yet been developed where the interaction of Focus and the semantics 
of modals is made explicit. But von Fintel ( 1 999) discusses this issue and proposes 
that Focus induces a presupposition about the context. Such a presupposition can 
narrow down the modal base, so as to only include the propositions that are relevant. 
The Ordered Alternatives Theory explains these facts in a quite elegant way. 
Given the definition for want based on an alternative semantics, we expect to find an 
analogy to other Focus sensitive operators , such as only. Both want and only make 
reference to a domain of quantification C of contextually determined alternatives . 
Rooth ( 1 992) proposes that focus can constrain the set of alternatives that this 
variable C refers to. In (46), C is the set of propositions of the form 'x brings the 
chocolate cake' , in (47) ,  it is the set of propositions of the form 'SofIa brings the x '  . 
Below, I illustrate this with the tree structure for (46) . 
(46) S 
� 
NP VP 
� 
Vc CP 
� 
� - C  
NPF VP 
The Ordered Alternative Theory can thus straightforwardly account for association 
with Focus phenomena in embedded clauses . 
Interestingly, Boer ( 1979) notes that Focus does not have the same effect in 
the context of all propositional attitude verbs. Sentences containing know, for 
example, do not seem to give rise to the same difference in meaning when embedded 
constituents are focused. This provides evidence for the generalization that verbs 
selecting the indicative mood are not based on an alternative semantics. 
To summarize, in this section I have pointed to a number of problematic 
consequences of the Modal Theory of the subjunctive mood. We have seen that the 
Ordered Alternatives Theory, on the contrary, accommodates these challenges in a 
rather straightforward way. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued for a new semantics of the verbs that select the 
subjunctive mood in Spanish, based on an alternative semantics . I have proposed the 
following generalization for subjunctive mood in Spanish embedded clauses : an 
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embedded clause p is in the subjunctive mood if the proposition p is compared to 
contextual alternatives on a scale introduced by the matrix verb. Whether these 
alternatives are possible or counterfactual alternatives does not play a role for the 
distribution of subjunctive mood. 
First, I have discussed Heim' s semantics of desire predicates and proposed 
that it can be extended to the whole class of verbs that select the subjunctive mood. 
Then, based on contexts that make more than two alternatives available, I have 
argued that Heim' s semantics needs to be revised. Crucially, the new semantics 
involves comparison of p with its contextual alternatives .  Subjunctive clauses hence 
require contexts in which ordered alternatives are made available . 
Finally, I have presented a comparison of my proposal with Giorgi and 
Piannesi ' s  ( 1 997) approach to the subjunctive mood. I have shown that there are 
empirical differences between these two approaches . We have seen that a number of 
phenomena are problematic for the Modal Theory: practical inferences, contexts with 
more than two alternatives and entailment-relations. The proposal that I have 
developed here can straightforwardly accommodate the described facts . Finally, 
association with Focus phenomena follow directly from my approach .  We can then 
conclude that the Ordered Alternatives Theory for the subjunctive mood has 
empirical advantages over the Modal Theory. 
At present, I have developed a characterization of the verbs that select 
subjunctive mood in terms of an alternative semantics . What remains to be shown is 
that such a semantics can be extended to the other contexts in which subjunctive 
mood appears , such as relative clauses, certain adjunct clauses, conditionals, 
questions and under certain circumstances triggered by negation. I leave this for 
future research. 
Endnotes 
* I wish to thank Angelika Kratzer for invaluable help throughout this project. 
Thanks also to Barbara Partee and Yael Sharvit for extensive discussions and 
suggestions . Thanks to the audience of the SALT X conference at Cornell University 
for helpful comments . Earlier versions of the content of section 2 and 3 of this paper 
have also appeared in Villalta (2000) . 
1 .  I have adopted this verb classification following Farkas ( 1 992) . 
2. See Portner ( 1 999) for extensive discussion of recent approaches to the semantics 
of mood. For a summary of proposals offered in traditional grammars and 
transformational grammars see, for example, Bell ( 1 980), Bergen ( 1 978),  Klein 
( 1 974) , and Palmer ( 1 986) for a crosslinguistic survey on mood and modality. 
4. Not all verbs selecting the indicative mood disallow degree modification, though. 
For example, 'estar muy/demasiado seguro' ( ' to be very/too certain ') and 'prometer 
mucho/demasiado' ( ' to promise very much/too much ' )  seem possible . I leave a more 
detailed analysis of the semantics of these verbs for future research. 
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5. More precisely, the conversational background is a function f which assigns sets 
of propositions to possible worlds ; the set of worlds in which all propositions of f(w) 
are true constitutes the modal base. 
6. This is a simplified representation that is meant to illustrate a possible modal 
definition of want . See von Fintel ( 1 999) for a detailed discussion of the definedness 
conditions of verbs such as want, wish, be glad, be sorry. 
7. These examples are discussed in Kadmon & Landman ( 1 993) and von Fintel 
( 1 999), among others . These authors mainly concentrate on downward entailments 
that do not seem to survive in the context of verbs such as be surprised, regret, be 
sorry, even though negative polarity items are licensed in their complements . 
References 
Bell, A. 1 980. "Mood in Spanish: A discussion of some recent proposals". Hispania 
63, 377-390. 
Bergen, J .  1 978 ."One rule for the Spanish Subjunctive". Hispania 6 1 , 2 1 8-234. 
Boer, S. 1 979. "Meaning and Contrastive Stress". The Philosophical Review 2, 263-
298 .  
Bolinger, D. 1 968 . "Postposed Main Phrases : An English rule for the Romance 
subjunctive". In Canadian Journal of Linguistics 1 0, 1 25- 1 97 .  
Dretske, F.I. 1 972. "Contrastive Statements" Philosophical Review 8 1 , 4 1 1 -437 . 
Farkas, D. 1 985 .  Intensional Descriptions and the Romance Subjunctive Mood. 
Garland, New York. 
Farkas, D. 1 992. "On the Semantics of Subjunctive Complements" .  In Hirschbuehler 
& Koerner K. (eds .) Romance Languages and Modern Linguistic Theory. 
John Benjamins, 69- 103 .  
von Fintel, K .  1 994. Restrictions on Quantifier Domains. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. 
von Fintel, K. 1 999. "NPI-Licensing, Strawson-Entailment, and Context­
Dependency" . In Journal of Semantics 1 6. 1 .  
Giannakidou, A. 1 997 . The Landscape of Polarity Items. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Groningen. 
Givan, T. 1 994. "Irrealis and the Subjunctive". Studies in Language 1 8-2, 265-337.  
Giorgi & Piannesi 1 997. Tense and Aspect, From Semantics to Morphosyntax. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Heim, I. 1 992. "Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs" .  
Journal of Semantics 9, 1 83-22 1 .  
Hintikka, J .  1 969. Modelsfor Modalities: Selected Essays. Reidel . 
Kadmon N. & Landman F. 1 993 . "Any", Linguistics and Philosophy 1 6, 353-422. 
Klein, Philip Walter. 1 974. Observations on the Semantics of Mood in Spanish. 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Washington. 
Kratzer, A. 1 977. "What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean". Linguistics and 
Philosophy 1 , 337-355. 
255 
256 Elisabeth Villalta 
Kratzer, A. 1 98 1 .  "The Notional Category of Modality". In Eikmeyer, H. -J .& Rieser 
H. (eds . ) .  Words, Worlds, and Contexts: New Approaches in Word Semantics. 
de Gruyter, 38-74. 
Kratzer, A. 1 99 1 .  "Modality" . In von Stechow A. & Wunderlich D. (eds .) 
SemantikiSemantics: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research. 
Berlin : de Gruyter, 639-650. 
Krifka, M. 1 990. "Polarity Phenomena andAlternative Semantics" .Proceedings of 
the seventh Amsterdam Colloquium, 277-30 1 .  
Krifka, M .  1 992. "Some Remarks on Polarity Items".  In Zaefferer, D .  (ed.) Semantic 
Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris,  Berlin, 1 50- 1 89 .  
Krifka, M. 1 994. "The Semantics and Pragmatics of Weak and Strong Polarity Items 
in Assertions" . in M. Harvey & Santelmann, L. (eds .) ,  SALT IV, 1 95-2 1 9, 
Cornell University Press.lthaca, N.Y. 
Krifka, M. 1 995 . "The Semantics and Pragmatics of Polarity Items". Linguistic 
Analysis 25, 209-257 . 
Lewis, D. 1 973 .  Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Nathan G.S . and Epro M. W. 1 984."Negative Polarity and the Romance 
Subjunctive" in Baldi P. (ed.) .  Papers from the XIIth Linguistic Symposium 
on Romance Languages. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 5 1 7-529. 
Palmer, F.R. 1 986. Mood and Modality Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Portner, P. 1 992. Situation Theory and the Semantics of Propositional Expressions. 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst .  
Portner, P. 1 997. "The Semantics of Mood, Complementation, and Conversational 
Force". Natural Language Semantics 5, 1 67-2 1 2. 
Portner, P. 1 999. "The Semantics of Mood". Glot International, Vol 4, Issue 1 , 3-9. 
Quer, J .  1 997 . Mood at the Interface. Ph.D. dissertation, Groningen. 
Rooth, M. 1 985 .  Association with Focus. Ph. D. dissertation. University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Rooth, M. 1 992. "A Theory of Focus Interpretation" .Natural Language Semantics 
1 ,  75- 1 1 6. 
Stalnaker, R. 1 968.  "A Theory of Conditionals", Studies in Logical Theory, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph: 2, Blackwell, 98- 1 12 .  
Stalnaker, R .  1 979, "Assertion". In P.Cole (ed.) , Syntax and Semantics 9: 
Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press ,  3 1 5-332. 
Stalnaker, R. 1 984. Inquiry. MIT Press , Cambridge, Massachusetts . 
Terrell T. & Hooper, J .  1 974. "A semantically based analysis of Mood in Spanish" . 
Hispania 57,3 ,  484-494. 
Villalta E. 2000. "Subjunctive Mood in Spanish Embedded Clauses" . In Kusumoto 
K. & Villalta E. (eds .) .  Issues in Semantics. University of Massachusetts 
Occasional Papers, 23 . GLSA-publications, 285-307 .  
von Wright, G.H. 1 963 .  "Practical Inference". The Philosophical Review, 72. 
